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Some welfare implications of who goes first? in WTO negotiations

Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb - 2003

We envisage a logical framework to explain why some trade negotiations are delayed because parties differ on who should … modeled in this paper. As an institution with some power to set the rules of negotiations, the WTO should be able to … anticipate such conflicts in upcoming negotiations. It can then set the rule (in this case, dictate who should go first …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010279287

Alternative characterizations of the proportional solution for nonconvex bargaining problems with claims

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2008

We provide three alternative characterizations of the proportional solution defined on compact and comprehensive bargaining problems with claims that are not necessarily convex. One characterization result is obtained by using, together with other standard axioms, two solidarity axioms. Another...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280758

Dominance solvability of dynamic bargaining games

Tyson, Christopher J. - 2009

We formulate and study a general finite-horizon bargaining game with simultaneous moves and a disagreement outcome that need not be the worst possible result for the agents. Conditions are identified under which the game is dominance solvable in the sense that iterative deletion of weakly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010280787

Time is not money

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus - 2007

Casual observation suggests that people are more generous with their time than with their money. In this paper we present experimental evidence supporting the hypothesis. A third of our subjects demand no compensation for non-monetary investments, whereas almost all subjects demand compensation...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281212

Trust and truth

Ellingsen, Tore; Johannesson, Magnus; Lilja, Jannie; … - 2007

In a laboratory experiment, we create relationships between pairs of anonymous subjects through a Prisoners' dilemma game. Thereafter the same subjects play a private values (sealed-bid double auction) bargaining game with or without communication. Communication substantially increases...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281293

Costly renegotiation in repeated Bertrand games

Andersson, Ola; Wengström, Erik - 2010

This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281349

Bargaining and collusion in a regulatory model

Fiocco, Raffaele; Gilli, Mario - 2011

Within a standard three-tier regulatory model, a benevolent principal delegates to a regulatory agency two tasks: the supervision of the firm's (two-type) costs and the arrangement of a pricing mechanism. The agency may have an incentive to manipulate information to the principal to share the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281496

Effects of exclusion on social preferences

Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner - 2011

In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281631

Would you mind if I get more? An experimental study of the envy game

Casal, Sandro; Güth, Werner; Jia, Mofei; Ploner, Matteo - 2011

Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281655

Power asymmetry and escalation in bargaining

Vollstädt, Ulrike - 2011

Bargaining is prevalent in economic interactions. Under complete information, game theory predicts efficient bargaining outcomes (immediate acceptance of first offer) (see Rubinstein, 1982). However, continuous rejections of offers leading to inefficient delays (escalation) have regularly been...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281659