This paper concerns the design of a trading mechanism for a group of traders when their valuations of the good are private information and they bargain over who shall consume more than his initial endowment and who shall consume less. It is shown that there generally exists a set of initial...

Ausgehend von den institutionellen Grundlagen des JI-Konzeptes wird in diesem Aufsatz das Optimalverhalten der Jl-Parteien unter alternativen Regimebedingungen untersucht. Es wird zwischen staatlichen und privaten Investoren und zwischen dem gebundenen und dem ungebundenen Land (Vor-reiter)...

Public-private partnerships (P3s) typically rely on long-term contracts between participants. When conditions arise that fall outside the expectations embodied in the contract, one party may seek to renegotiate the contract terms. Globally, the frequency of P3 contract renegotiations has been...

Eine auf Paarebene getroffene Entscheidung kann für die einzelnen Partner unterschiedliche Folgen haben, insbesondere in der mittleren bis langen Frist. Durch Spezialisierungsentscheidungen auf unbezahlte Care-Arbeit und den damit verbundenen Rückzug vom Arbeitsmarkt gehen vor allem Frauen...

The paper analyzes the welfare properties of voluntary agreements (VA) with polluters, when they are obtained under the legislative threat of an alternative stricter policy option. In the model, the threat is an abatement quota. Both the threat and its probability of implementation are...

I present in this paper an integrated framework for structuring and evaluating dynamic and sequential climate change decision making in the international arena taking into account influence processes occuring during negotiation rounds. The analysis integrates imitation, persuasion and dissuasion...

This paper studies the incentives for international cooperation if (some) countries prefer a more equitable distribution of per capita emission levels. The impact of such an equity preference is analyzed first for a bilateral, and then for a multilateral environmental problem. We show that -...