Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their...

Negotiators often bargain on behalf of others. In many cases, these constituents set the goals they want their negotiators to achieve at the table. We argue that prior evidence for superior results of promotion-focused negotiators may not hold when goals are set by others. We report the results...

This paper proposes a new solution concept to three-player coalitional bargaining problems where the underlying economic opportunities are described by a partition function. This classic bargaining problem is modeled as a dynamic non-cooperative game in which players make conditional or...

This paper investigates the role of uncertainty as a tool to support cooperation in international environmental agreements. We consider two layers of uncertainty: one where only the follower is uninformed about the leader's environmental concern, which we refer as "unilateral uncertainty," and...

Cooperative actions are central to a problem-solving approach in negotiation. In deciding how to approach a negotiation, individuals draw on multiple cues to assess the likelihood that the other party will reciprocate cooperative actions. Using a simulated business negotiation, we examined how...

The agreement trap occurs when negotiators reach deals that are inferior to their best alternative agreements. The paper extends prior negotiation research by investigating whether teams display greater wisdom than solos in knowing when to walk away from the negotiating table, and thereby avoid...

We find that negotiators behave less ethically when they perceive the outcome of the negotiation to be a potential loss instead of a potential gain. Furthermore, negotiators assess the outcome of the negotiation to be more important and the future relationship with the other party to be worse,...

I consider two new simple bargaining games in which two players bargain over division of a fixed amount of money. Both games are strategically equivalent to the dictator game, in that one player has the unilateral ability to determine the allocation. However, that player can instead choose to...