To analyze players' strategic alliance behavior, we introduce a new noncooperative coalitional bargaining model, in which each player can buy out other players with upfront transfers. We uncover the role of an essential player in a transferable utility game, or a veto player in a simple game, in...

Unlike the narrow approach currently prevailing in the literature, this paper proposes a Nash bargaining model to explore an optimal strategy for state-owned enterprise (SOE) reforms in China. We argue that ceteris paribus the current illnesses of low efficiency and rent-seeking commonly...

The allocative efficiency outcome predicted by the Coase theorem critically depends on the assumption that, barring high transaction costs, parties will bargain after litigation and mis-allocated entitlements by courts will be re-allocated through voluntary exchanges. Ward Farnsworth's 1999...

We study a bargaining model in which a buyer makes frequent offers to a privately informed seller, while gradually learning about the seller's type from “news.” We show that the buyer's ability to leverage this information to extract more surplus from the seller is remarkably limited. In...

This paper considers the possibility of efficient trade in bilateral bargaining through an informed broker. I propose a cross-subsidization mechanism that implements efficient trade in dominant strategies. I provide a condition on the broker's information such that efficient trade can be achieved

Assets range in the degree of standardization from less standardized real estate or municipal bonds to more standardized futures or Treasuries. I study bargaining over a non-standardized asset between sophisticated investors who possess precise private information about its value to parties. The...

Theory provides competing predictions on the question of whether informed investors immediately trade on newly generated private information. We address this question using SEC-mandated disclosures to identify the dates when new private information about target or acquiring firm value is...

In all of negotiation, there is no bigger trap than "fairness." This chapter from the Negotiator's Fieldbook explains why among multiple models of fairness, people tend to believe that the one that applies here is the one that happens to favor them. This often creates a bitter element in...