The purpose of this chapter is to survey the academic literature on the economics of litigation and to synthesize its main themes. The chapter begins by introducing the basic economic framework for studying litigation and out-of-court settlement. One set of issues addressed is positive (or...

This chapter focuses on the focal points and bargaining. The idea of a focal point is of great practical importance. However, no consensus exists concerning the manner in which focal points become established or survive after their establishment. At one extreme, some authors emphasize...

Although fairness concerns may be relevant, they appear to be too simple an explanation for why game theory's strong predictions for ultimatum games are so rarely supported. Self interested offerers want to avoid rejections; unpredicted, non-equilibrium behavior is more valuable and effective...

This chapter extends research on strategic display of emotions (Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006) and investigates how negotiators can optimize both relational and economic outcomes through strategic response to displayed emotions. First, we consider what information can be gained from...

Power is widely acknowledged to affect negotiator performance. Yet few efforts have been made to integrate the most prominent theories of power into a cohesive framework that can account for the results from a broad array of negotiation-relevant research. We address this limitation by proposing...

The present paper analyzes the dynamics of bargaining of the ultimatum game in presence of social differences amidst the participants. To that end, two parallel experiments were set-up. One where the social status states of the individuals were of common knowledge (alternative version) and...