Similar Search Results

Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions

Attar, Andrea; Piaser, Gwenael; Porteiro, Nicolas - 2006

This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters (2003, J. Eco. Theory) and suggests that indifference of the single agent with respect to principals' offers plays an important role in the failure of the Revelation Principle in Common Agency games. In addition we provide a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027080

On the Strategic Use of Focal Points in Bargaining Situations

Janssen, Maarten C. W. - 2006

This paper argues that the notion of focal points is important in understanding bargaining processes. Recent literature confines a discussion of the usefulness of the notion to coordination problems and when bargaining experiments result in outcomes that are inconsistent with a straightforward...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027110

Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences

Houba, Harold; Wen, Quan - 2006

There has been a long debate on equilibrium characterization in the negotiation model when players have different time preferences. We show that players behave quite differently under different time preferences than under common time preferences. Conventional analysis in this literature relies...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027199

Negotiation Analysis : Between Decisions and Games

Sebenius, James K. - 2007

various actions. It has been used to develop prescriptive advice for the simplest bilateral negotiations between monolithic … parties, for negotiations through agents or with linked "internal" and "external" aspects, for negotiations in hierarchies and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027293

Fair, Efficient and Envy-Free Bargaining : An Experimental Test of the Brams-Taylor Adjusted Winner Mechanism

Daniel, Terrence (Terry) E.; Parco, James E. - 2008

The Adjusted Winner mechanism for two-player bargaining has been theoretically shown to produce fair (efficient and envy-free) outcomes (Brams and Taylor 1996). We study this claim experimentally in a bilateral bargaining game of incomplete information for two divisible goods using three...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027622

Stochastic Orders of Proposing Players in Bargaining

Houba, Harold - 2005

The bargaining model with stochastic order of proposing players is properly embedded in continuous time and it is strategically equivalent to the alternating offers model. For all parameter values, the pair of equilibrium proposals corresponds to the Nash bargaining solution of a modified...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027818

Waiting to Settle : Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases

Ali, S. Nageeb - 2005

We study multilateral bargaining games where agents disagree over their bargaining power. We show that if agents are extremely optimistic, there may be costly delays in an arbitrarily long finite game but if optimism is moderate, all sufficiently long games end in immediate agreement. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027855

Linguistic Style Matching and Negotiation Outcome

Taylor, Paul J.; Thomas, Sally - 2014

their word use - and negotiation outcome. Nine hostage negotiations were divided into 6 time stages and the dialogue of … negotiations were associated with higher aggregate levels of Linguistic Style Matching (LSM) than unsuccessful negotiations. This … result was due to dramatic fluctuations of LSM during unsuccessful negotiations, with negotiators unable to maintain the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027897

Friendly Threats? The Linking of Threats and Promises in Negotiation

Lytle, Anne L.; Kopelman, Shirli - 2010

The strategic use of threats in negotiations does not always result in the intended outcome for the threatener. While …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027915

An Experimental Analysis of Needs in Ultimatum Bargaining

J; Thorisdottir, Hulda - 2005

We tested the proposition that perceived need plays an important role in judgments about what is fair and thus what happens in ultimatum bargaining (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982). In the ultimatum paradigm, there are 2 players, a proposer and a responder, and the issue is how to divide...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027998