I study the effect of timing of negotiation on the resolution of the hold-up problem. I show that the investor can invest optimally, if the non-investor can commit to initiate negotiation in a specific time period. This way I demonstrate that contracting parties can use negotiation timing...

We introduce aggregate uncertainty into a Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985)-type dynamic matching and bilateral bargaining model. The market can be either in a high state, where there are more buyers than sellers, or in a low state, where there are more sellers than buyers. Traders do not know the...

Two agents endowed with di fferent individual conceptual spaces are engaged in a dialectic process to reach a common understanding. We model the process as a simple noncooperative game and demonstrate three results. When the initial disagreement is focused, the bargaining process has a zero-sum...

Belligerents could in principle avoid the ex post costs of conflict by revealing all private information about their violent capabilities and then calculating odds of success ex ante. Incentives to misrepresent private information for strategic gain, however, can cause miscalculations that lead...

A negotiation model combines an alternating offers bargaining game with a normal form stage game that determines players' (interim) disagreement payoffs. Busch and Wen (1995) investigated this negotiation model under the assumption that players' past mixed disagreement actions are observable....

This paper examines how price negotiation process affects the profit of smallholder vegetable farmers. The data was collected through focus group discussion, and key-informant interviews. The market chain analysis revealed that market actors such as wholesaler governed the price determination...