Outcomes under the Baron-Ferejohn (1989) model are investigated when proposers distribute benefits versus imposing costs under an experimental design where predicted outcomes are theoretically isomorphic, absent reference dependent preferences. Initial experimental sessions showed greater...

This paper takes an axiomatic bargaining approach to bankruptcy problems with nontransferable utility by characterizing bankruptcy rules in terms of properties from bargaining theory. In particular, we derive new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional rule, the truncated proportional...

We examine the relations between recent board declassifications, takeover activity and takeover gains over the period 2003-2014. We report that firms that declassified their boards in the previous five years are more likely to be the target of a takeover compared to firms that remain classified....

One strand of the Neo-Brandeisian critique of traditional antitrust involves the permissive approach to exploitative pricing. Exploitative pricing by powerful firms with durable, but legitimately obtained market power, including non-innovative oligopolists that succeed in coordinating prices...

We study ultimatum bargaining games with asymmetric information regarding disagreement payoffs. Results from Mensch (2020) are used to find conditions under which a monotonic equilibrium exists in these games. A standard single crossing assumption implies the existence of a monotonic Nash...

Monopolists often exploit a deadline to boost their bargaining power, but historically, experiments document significant compromises in ultimatums. Motivated by this gap between theory and the real world, I explore whether the market designer can leverage the fairness of the monopolist to...