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(Marjit & Sarkar, 2017) have proved the existence of a unique inequalitypreservingredistribution allocation in the … contract curve. The allocation is provenfor those measures of inequalities which satisfy certain criterion. We … investigatewhether their Strong Pareto Superior (SPS) allocation hold in a specialscenario, which moves away from their stated axioms. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251617
) mechanism, which ensures an efficient and fair allocation and is robust to manipulations via demand. Our SPIP mechanism was …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256267
We introduce ex-ante Pareto efficiency, which is a slightly weaker notion of efficiency than ex-post Pareto efficiency. We strengthen the impossibility between ex-post Pareto efficiency, strategyproofness, and envy-freeness in the random assignment problem and show that it prevails if ex-post...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014256336
Consider agents who undertake costly effort to produce stochastic outputs observable by a principal. The principal can award a prize deterministically to the agent with the highest output, or to all of them with probabilities that are proportional to their outputs. We show that, if there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014171015
This paper extends the standard redistribution axioms to the case where the income units differ for example by size, deserve or need. It is essentially based on a generalization of Muirhead's Lemma. The standard case where all units are alike falls off as a particular case
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014087572
model this notion precisely, and define two kinds of Kantian allocation. An set of strategies by players is Kantian if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014055742
We study the problem of assigning a set of objects to a set of agents, when each agent is supposed to receive only one object and has strict preferences over the objects. In the absence of monetary transfers, we focus on the probabilistic rules, which takes the ordinal preferences as input (the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014183439
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001694409
We assume that a voter’s judgment about a proposal depends on (i) the proposal’s probability of being right (or good or just) and (ii) the voter’s probability of making a correct judgment about its rightness (or wrongness). Initially, the state of a proposal (right or wrong), and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014042385
We study divisor methods, the primary class to solve apportionment problems, based upon Stolarsky means S(alphabeta). These encompass the five traditional methods. We disclose a one-to-one relation between methods of the form S(alpha1) and aggregate measures of seat/vote disproportionality of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014212723