An example of an exchange economy is provided, satisfying all the assumptions as in Dubey-Shubik (1988), for which the trivial Nash Equilibrium is the unique equilibrium point of the associated market game. From this example, we are led to propose an argument, related to the intensity of...

In many european countries, public opinion seems to be worried about the effect of lower-wage country competition. In newspapers' articles, as well as in policy debates, the terms "social dumpingll becomes more and more popular. Trade unions, worried by the effect of what they call "unfair...

Domestic transfers such that all individuals gain in utility with international trade, compared to domestic autarky, need not exist.

In this paper we investigate, via an example, the effects of oligopolistic competition in a two countries two goods" Ricardian" model of international trade. By contrast with results that apply to the competitive free trade equilibrium, at the oligopoly equilibrium industries with different...

We analyze the principle of comparative advantage when agents in the world market are aware of the influence their individual supply exerts on the equilibrium exchange rate of goods. We show that specialization following comparative disadvantage can be an oligopoly equilibrium in a Ricardian...

Should donors interested in the effectiveness of developmental programmes rely on conditional budget support or on project aid? To answer this question, we present a model in which only a subset of developmental expenditures can be subject to conditionality. We show that budget support is...

In this paper, we examine how country insurance schemes affect policymakers' incentives to undertake reforms. Such schemes (especially when made contingent on negative external shocks) are more likely to foster than to delay reform in crisis-prone volatile economies. The consequences of country...

In an intertemporal general equilibrium framework, we compare a Cournot equilibrium to the Walras equilibrium. The Cournot agents trade and invest less than the Walras agents. This generates an ineffciency which does not vanish as the number of Cournot agents tends to infinity. A larger number...

This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF. The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are published to...

Under what conditions should grants be preferred to loans? To answer this question, we present a simple model à la Krugman (1988) and show that, for any given level of development assistance, higher concessionality is good for growth if countries are poor, have bad policies, and have high debt...