We study the role of information exchange, leadership and coordination in team or partnership structures. For this purpose, we view individuals jointly engaging in productive processes a team' as endowed with individual and privately held information on the joint production process. Once...

We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase their...

We document the relationship of a set of individual choices - including parenthood, marital state, and income - with an individual’s cause of death. Using the data set of the Office for National Statistics Longitudinal Study (ONS-LS) which follows one percent of the population of England and...

We look at a job-market model of bilateral uncertainty. Workers are uncertain about what job descriptions advertised by firms really mean and firms are uncertain about the qualifications of workers before they are interviewed. Both types of uncertainty can be resolved but both processes are...

Game-theoretic models consist of a formal game structure and an informal model narrative or story. When game theory is employed to model economic situations, the stories play a central role in interpreting, constructing and solving game structures. We analyse the architecture of game theory and...

We analyse a procurement auction in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of money they offer. Sellers are privately informed on the quality of the technology or good they offer. We assume that the procurer cannot perfectly identify the best offer. Thus,...

We analyse the effect of the voluntary adoption of a living wage on firms operating in product markets in which consumption behaviour is at least partly determined by reputational concerns for ethical firm behaviour. We show without recourse to morality or efficiency-wage theories that the...

We analyse procurement auctions in which sellers are distinguished on the basis of the ratios of quality per unit of money that they offer. Sellers are privately informed on the offered quality of the technology or good. We assume that the procurer cannot perfectly identify the best offer. Thus,...

We analyse the all-pay auction with incomplete information and variance-averse bidders. We characterise the symmetric equilibrium for general distributions of valuations and any number of bidders. Variance aversion is a sufficient assumption to predict that high-valuation bidders increase their...

Review of: Game Theory: 5 Questions. By Vincent F. Hendricks and Pelle Guldborg Hansen. 2004. Automatic Press/VIP: Denmark. no abstract available.