We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate … the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an … employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for …

We consider a Rothschild-Stiglitz-Spence labour market screening model and employ a centralised mechanism to coordinate … the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an … employment office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submitwage-bids for …

better off under the dynamic mechanism relative to a Vickrey-like auction because the intermediaries are more able to exploit …-like auction. Finally, I show that in large markets the dynamic mechanism and Vickrey-like auction have the same expected total …

efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an employment … office or head hunter. In a centralised descending-bid, multi-item procurement auction, workers submit wage-bids for each job …

ensuing auction, leading to loss of efficiency and eliminating the revenue dominance typically observed in first …

signal’s informativeness, the all-pay auction raises lower revenue than the second-price auction, whereas the revenue ranking … between the all-pay and the first-price auction is ambiguous …

auction model in which a seller's choice of reserve price signals her private information about the object's quality. We show …. We estimate the reserve price signaling model using a novel dataset from a large online auto auction platform. We find …

learns his own valuation. Using a simple discrete asymmetric first-price auction setting, we show that a bidder may indeed …-price auction model. Finally, we use a specific signaling structure with uniform distributions to show that signaling need not be … beneficial for any precision of the signal. -- Asymmetric auction ; first-price auction ; signaling …