approach is the simultaneous ascending auction, in which many related lots are auctioned simultaneously in a sequence of rounds … variation, the package clock auction, adopted by the UK, which addresses many of the problems of the simultaneous ascending … auction while building on its strengths. The package clock auction is a simple dynamic auction in which bidders bid on …

of a multi-object auction. After the auction either all bids or only the prices to be paid are revealed to all firms … bidders' costs generally depends on the type and fierceness of the market competition, the specific auction format, and the …

advertise with a novel model of demand in an auction market environment. Because we explicitly model the process of arrival of …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction and the second-price sealed-bid auction in a … winner's payment to an outside observer. We find that the first-price sealed-bid auction in which the winner's payment is …

We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential …

We study the relative performance of the first-price sealed-bid auction, the second-price sealed-bid auction, and the … all-pay sealed-bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour …-bid auction in which the bidders’ payments are revealed outperforms the other mechanisms in terms of revenue, while this mechanism …

seller’s private signal. A public reserve price is announced before the auction starts, and a secret reserve price is …

the literature in the framework of the SEAMO (simultaneous English auction for multiple objects) don't have a counterpart … in the JAMO (Japanese auction for multiple objects). We show however that certain retaliatory equilibria do exist in both …

the detailed information about the market achieves efficiency. Namely, the 40% handicap auction, a modified English … auction in which a newcomer that wins a license has to pay only 40% of the winning price, always achieves an efficient market …

We develop a principal/agent model for matching agents in two-sided assignments. A principal has preferences over all … principal can choose her preferred allocation (given constraints). The mechanism can be interpreted as a scoring auction. We …