We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …

This paper asks how to design a revenue-maximizing auction in the presence of post-auction market competition and … asymmetric information. In this situation, bidders, depending on the auction mechanism, can signal their type through their … bidding behavior which influences the outcome of the post-auction market game. Thus the auctioneer has to design a mechanism …

auction makes participation observable via an entry fee. With convex signaling concerns, optimal auctions are fully … transparent: every standard auction, which reveals all bids yields maximal revenue. With concave signaling concerns there is no …

A seller possessing private information about the quality of a good attempts to sell it through a second-price auction … equilibria with monotone beliefs of the resulting signalling game and show that they lead to a reduced probability of selling the … good compared to the symmetric information situation. We compare the unique separating equilibrium of this signalling game …

auction makes participation observable via an entry fee. With convex signaling concerns, optimal auctions are fully … transparent: every standard auction, which reveals all bids yields maximal revenue. With concave signaling concerns there is no …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders' types. We show that this … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. The expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal …

We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the … participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this … auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. When the bidders’ sensibility for the signaling concern is …