a simple design initially enhances competition in the auction. Moreover, the procurer cannot benefit from using a multi …-dimensional auction, as the optimal scoring rule depends only on the price. …

trade at a fixed price before an auction. In the "Buy-It-Now" format, the seller offers a price prior to the auction …

overbidding in auctions. As a workhorse we use the second-price all-pay and the first-price winner-pay auction. Both risk and …. Indeed, we find that spite is a more convincing explanation for bidding behavior for the second-price all-pay auction. Not …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which …

cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction …

studied for non-rivalrous goods. I examine an auction framework where the good sold can be used simultaneously by multiple … bidders if their use does not conflict with others; this simultaneous use directly affects the efficiency of the auction. A … price auction over non-conflicting groups and examine how non-rivalry impacts both efficiency and collusion. Conditions are …

interests that played a deci- sive role in the establishment of the auction mechanism. The article provides an analysis of the … formal and informal rules of the auction trade for real estate and argues that 19 th century real estate auctions did not … than auction theory assumes. …