their auction end at the evening, when many potential buyers may be online. …

optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If … matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if … matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss …

settings can serve as an abstraction of large scale decentralized Internet auction marketplaces, such as eBay. I characterize … auctions. In such equilibria auction revenue is an increasing convex function of seller reputation. Allowing unit …

In this paper we consider equilibrium behavior in a Dutch (descending price) auction where the bidders are uninformed … auction. We assume that the information acquisition activity is covert. We characterize the equilibrium behavior in a setting …, the Dutch auction produces more revenue than would a first price auction …

We consider a standard two-player all-pay auction with private values, where the valuation for the object is private … bid as much as the other bidder to win the auction. Analogously, the other bidder is handicapped by the rule as … overbidding the rival may not be enough to win the auction. Clearly, this has important implications on equilibrium behavior. We …

This paper considers the ramifications of post-auction competition on bidding behavior under different bid announcement … policies. In equilibrium, players attempt to signal information to their post-auction competitors through their bids. Thus, an … auction procedures in the world today …