Similar Search Results

Jewitt, Ian; Li, Daniel Z. - 2021

This paper explores how a seller should transmit product information to bidders with horizontally differentiated preferences. Under cheap-talk, we show that, in an informative equilibrium, the seller provides less precise information for more popular product attributes. Second, for any given...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250400

Asymmetric Information in Auctions : Are Resellers Better Appraisers?

Koptyug, Nikita - 2016

heterogeneity in the dispersion of private value components. I use the asymmetric ascending auction model of Hong and Shum (2003) to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012998398

The Effective Use of Limited Information : Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Costs in Asymmetric Auctions

Hellerstein, Daniel - 2016

This study empirically investigates the extent of noncompliance with the tax code and examines the determinants of federal income tax evasion in the U.S. Employing a refined version of Feige's (1986; 1989) General Currency Ratio (GCR) model to estimate a time series of unreported income as our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012998594

Effects of Seller's Information Disclosure in Equity Auctions Requiring Post-Auction Investment

Sogo, Takeharu - 2017

takeovers. After the auction, the winning bidder decides whether to make follow-up investments in the acquired asset and makes … the equity payment out of the revenue from it according to the auction outcome. Before the auction, the seller holds …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012952539

Front-Running, Smart Contracts, and Candle Auctions

Häfner, Samuel; Stewart, Alistair - 2021

shill bidding in strategy-proof auctions more generally. As a remedy, this paper considers an ascending auction with a … random ending time --- a so-called candle auction. Time is discrete and in every round, the bidders bid sequentially and in a … fixed order. The bidder with the highest bid at the end of the decisive round wins the auction and pays her bid. We show …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013227449

Buyout Decision of Level-k Bidders in Second-price Auctions

Tsuchihashi, Toshihiro - 2021

's buyout decision in auctions. We analyze it following level-k auction theory which was proposed by Crawford and Iriberri … level-k. Further, we suggest that level-k bidder is willing to buy the object at a high buy price and thus enhances auction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013241347

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

Mechanism design is a subfield of game theory that aims to design games whose equilibria have desired properties such as achieving high efficiency or high revenue. Algorithmic mechanism design is a subfield that lies on the border of mechanism design and computer science and deals with mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Mergers Among Asymmetric Bidders : A Logit Second-Price Auction Model

Froeb, Luke M.; Tschantz, Steven; Crooke, Philip - 2012

extreme value, asymmetric, second-price, private-values auction. In equilibrium, prices (winning bids) and shares (winning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028159

Strategic Foundations of Rational Expectations

Barelli, Paulo; Govindan, Srihari; Wilson, Robert - 2022

condition for total monotonicity. The REE is an efficient SCF so it is attainable by an auction if and only if it satisfies …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029999

Ordinal Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions

Chakraborty, Archishman; Gupta, Nandini; Harbaugh, Rick - 2014

Sellers benefit on average from revealing information about their goods to buyers, but the incentive to exaggerate undermines the credibility of seller statements. When multiple goods are being auctioned, we show that ordinal cheap talk, which reveals a complete or partial ordering of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031810