settings in which the class of optimal mechanisms has a deferred acceptance auction representation which allows an … implementation with a descending-clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks descend synchronously such …

strategies. We derive the class of optimal mechanisms and show that it has a deferred acceptance auction representation. This … feature guarantees an implementation with a descending clock auction. Only in the case of symmetric projects do price clocks …

I study a principal's optimal choice of constraint for an agent participating in an auction (or auction-like allocation … that the optimal auction with budget-constrained bidders has a standard solution analogous to the one for classic models. …

competitively in a limited number of auctions only, and we discuss how our results can help to improve oil and gas tract auction …

implemented via a simple two-stage qualifying auction. In the first stage of the qualifying auction, non-binding bids are … submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve …

When capacity-constrained bidders have information about a good sold in a future auction, they need to take the … second object submit a positive bid in the first auction, because losing the first auction is informative about the remaining … trade, the sequential auction with information about future goods is a very efficient trading mechanism, achieving more than …

. I study a standard all-pay auction in which bidders' valuations are commonly known but their participation decisions … private. Each potential bidder has to incur an entry cost in order to participate in the auction. It is found that fully …