Empirical evidence suggests that even those firms presumably most in need of monitoring-intensive financing (young, small, and innovative firms) have a multitude of bank lenders, where one may be special in the sense of relationship lending. However, theory does not tell us a lot about the...

This paper investigates whether limited liability affects risk-taking through motivated beliefs. To do so, we run a within-subject experiment in which subjects invest in a risky asset under full or limited liability. In both cases, before the investment is made, subjects observe a noisy signal...

The authors show how the influence of extrinsic random signals depends on the noise structure of these signals. They present an experiment on a coordination game in which extrinsic random signals may generate sunspot equilibria. They measure how these signals affect behavior. Sunspot equilibria...

This volume investigates different aspects of monetary policy and prevention of financial crises. It discusses some recently suggested measures for central banks' responses to liquidity shortages and to the liquidity trap, methods for assessing the potential of crisis contagion via the interbank...

This paper explores three aspects of strategic uncertainty: its relation to risk, predictability of behavior and subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment, we measure subjects' certainty equivalents for three coordination games and one lottery. Behavior in coordination games is...

It is an open question whether and how indexed wage contracts reduce welfare or raise average inflation. This paper analyzes the impact of indexed wage contracts on inflation and social welfare in a Barro-Gordon model with discretionary monetary policy by endogenizing social costs of indexation....

This paper investigates whether limited liability and moral hazard affect risk-taking through motivated beliefs. On the one hand, limited liability pushes investors towards taking excessive risks. On the other, such excesses make it hard for investors to maintain a positive self-image when moral...

This paper reconsiders a central bank's problem of determining rules for information dissemination and risk taking behavior that minimize the probability of currency crises. In a global games approach, we find that optimal transparency is adversely related to prior market beliefs. In countries...