While increasing the number of small donors, standard linear matching schemes have been shown to cause considerable crowding out in charitable giving with pronounced effects on large gifts. We propose a form of threshold matching where donations above a certain, potentially personalized,...

We study an investment experiment with a representative sample of German households. Respondents invest in a safe asset and a risky asset whose return is tied to the German stock market. Experimental investments correlate with beliefs about stock market returns and exhibit desirable external...

From the regulation of sports to lawmaking in parliament, in many situations one group of people ("agents") make decisions that affect the payoffs of others ("principals") who may offer action-contingent transfers in order to sway the agents' decisions. Prat and Rustichini (2003) characterize...

Some companies engage in mass fundraising - where thousands of recipients are asked to make small donations - in addition to their core business. Via a corpo-rate social responsibility (CSR) channel this may increase sales. However, recent research uncovered significant "ask avoidance" which, if...

Previous studies of charitable giving have focused on middle or higher income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor. Despite this focus, the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. In a large-scale natural field...

We study a form of threshold matching where donations above a certain threshold are topped up with a fixed amount. We show theoretically that threshold matching can induce crowding in if appropriately personalized. In a field experiment, we explore how thresholds should be chosen depending on...

Competition in some markets is a contest. This paper studies the merger incentives in such markets. Merger can be profitable. The profitability depends on the post-merger contest st ructure, the discriminatory power of the contest and on the number of contestants

In this experiment, we analyze strategic delegation in a Cournot duopoly. Owners can choose among two different contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus....