In this paper I demonstrate the existence an initial incomplete contract that can subsequently be renegociated to the set of first best allocations in a fairly geneal principal-agent model when the state space is continuous.

In this paper a stylized labour contarct model is constructed where it is shown that when contracts are enforced by a specific performance rule, then above mentioned unfortunate features emerge. Thse features 'disappear' when the environment is amended by assuming that the court uses an at-will...

Economic theory predicts that it is impossible to have cooperation in finitely repeated games such as a prisoner's dilemma game without communication. In an experiment on a voluntary participation game with a non-excludable public good that is a version of a Hawk-Dove game, we obderved that...

In this paper, we shall provide a theoretical overview of what are the chief implications of fucusing institutions and economic systems, what are the main sources of their evolution, how are their evolutionary paths affected by various economic factors. In the latter half, we shall provide a...