We consider conflicts between an incumbent, e.g. government or dominant firm, and potential challengers, e.g. guerilla movement or entrants. It is not uncommon for challengers to win such conflicts despite their lack of resources. They can do this by exploiting a second mover advantage: choosing...

In this paper we discuss the level set method of Joó and how to use it to give an elementary proof of the well-known Sion’s minimax result. Although this proof technique is initiated by Joó and based on the inter-section of upper level sets and a clever use of the topological notion...

The banks in the Dutch chipcard market initially agreed on one chipcard system. One system is attractive for companies as well as consumers. Companies, banks and retailers, prevent costs of duplication, while consumers enjoy the benefits of a widespread acceptance of one card and do not face...

The self-organization into cooperative regimes of a system of "selfish" agents playing the pairwise Prisoner's Dilemma game (PDG) is analyzed using a simple agent-based model. At each time step t, the agents divide into those who cooperate (C) and those who defect (D). The agents have no memory...

We study games played between groups of players, where a given group decides which strategy it will play through a vote by its members. When groups consist of two voting players, our games can also be interpreted as network-formation games. In experiments on Stag Hunt games, we find that that...

The authors show how microeconomic concepts and principles are applicable to the study of terrorism. The utility maximization model provides insights into both terrorist resource allocation choices and government counterterrorism efforts, and basic game theory helps characterize the strategic...

We argue that trust can be incentivised by measures which increase the ability of trusters to protect themselves against risk. We work within the framework originally established by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) in which trust is measured experimentally as the ability to generate reciprocity...

This paper compares the standard procedure of playing dictator and ultimatum games with the same games played by participants who knew the family name of their counterparts. When these names were revealed, dictators allocated a significantly larger portion of the pie.