The paper deals with the literature on social evolution.

This paper explores the quantitative relation between non-random, assortative matching and the maintenance of cooperative behavior under evolutionary dynamics.

This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social choice functions in the traditional sense. Will the agents actually play the equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study the dynamic implementation of the first-best solution for the so-called King...

We explore the effects of social distance on reciprocal behavior in an experiment conducted over the Internet on three continents and in classroom laboratory sessions conducted in Israel and Spain.

In the literature on vertical relations little attention has been paid to the tole of strategic uncertainty, that is, the presence of multiple self-enforcing outcomes which might lead to coordination failure. However, if firms have some degree of freedom in designing the industrial relations...

We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude.

Laboratory and field studies of time preference find that discount rates are much greater in the short-run than in the long-run. Hyperbolic discount functions capture this property. This paper solves the decision problem of a hyperbolic consumer who faces stochastic income and a borrowing...

We suppose the principal not only designs a mechanism, but can participate as a plyer. The result is a Bayesian model where one player, the pricipal has no information, and the remaining players have complete information.