This paper argues that the sign of external effects of coalition formation provides a useful organizing principle in … examining economic coalitions. In many interesting economic games, coalition formation creates either negativee externalities or … of positive externalities include output cartels and public goods coalitions. I characterize and compare stable coalition …

schemes in order to influence the government's choice on the level of provision of public goods. Using perfectly coalition …

players in a two - and three - member coalition in terms of the payoffs. It turns out that in a sequential equilibrium, these … associated with different coalition sizes and structures so that honesty and cheating do matter in this sense …

coalitions in simple games. We characterise those sets of players which can be imposed in the equilibrium coalition and show that … the only decisive structures where the agenda setter can impose the presence of any minimal winning coalition are apex … games, where a large player forms a winning coalition with any of the small players …

We adopt the largest consistent set defined by Chwe [J. of Econ. Theory 63 (1994), 299-235] to predict which coalition …, based on the assumption that players are cautious. For games with positive spillovers, many coalition structures may belong … to the largest consistent set. The grand coalition, which is the efficient coalition structure, always belongs to the …

by Greenberg (1989, 1990) to account for self-enforcing coalitional deviations. An agreement is stable if no coalition …

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …

increasing as a coalition adds to its members. The new feature in the mechanism is that the proposer has a choice to implement …