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Job promotion tournaments and imperfect recall

Gürtler, Oliver - 2006

In this paper, a promotion tournament is considered, where, at the beginning of the tournament, it is unknown how long the tournament lasts. Further, the promotion decision is based on the assessments of a supervisor with imperfect recall. In line with psychological research, the supervisor is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365873

Incentivizing creativity : a large-scale experiment with tournaments and gifts

Bradler, Christiane; Neckermann, Susanne; Warnke, Arne - 2016

This paper reports the results from a large-scale laboratory experiment investigating the impact of tournament incentives and wage gifts on creativity. We find that tournaments substantially increase creative output, with no evidence for crowding out of intrinsic motivation. By comparison, wage...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011479746

Incentivizing creativity : a large-scale experiment with tournaments and gifts

Bradler, Christiane; Neckermann, Susanne; Warnke, Arne Jonas - 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011459389

Cheat to win : how to hack tournament theory

Arend, Richard J. - In: Business research quarterly : BRQ 22 (2019) 4, pp. 216-225

It may be surprising that one of the most popular compensation schemes in business is so open to being hacked - to having managers cheat to win. We explore tournament theory to detail its vulnerabilities to various forms of cheating unilateral and multilateral. We identify who is most likely to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012120156

Risk-Taking in Dynamic Contests

Usvitskiy, Alexander - 2022

We investigate a process of decision-making in a multi-period winner-take-all contest, in which competing players simultaneously choose among actions with different levels of risk every period. Strategic risk-taking is analyzed in isolation from effort choices, and, according to expected utility...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014081228

Intrafirm conflicts and interfirm competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2011

We study strategic interfirm competition allowing for internal conflicts in each seller firm. Intrafirm conflicts are …, interfirm competition leads to a higher revenue share for the agents, higher equilibrium effort levels and higher agent utility … employed by the competing firms. -- agency theory ; strategic interfirm competition ; revenue sharing …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009233357

Intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competition

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2009

We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competition on a duopolistic market with seller … firms employing one or more agents and implementing tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to … ; strategic competition …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003803472

Optimal prizes in dynamic elimination contests : an experimental analysis ; conference paper

Stracke, Rudi; Höchtl, Wolfgang; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; … - 2013

This paper investigates the effects of different prize structures on the effort choices of participants in two-stage elimination contests. A format with a single prize is shown to maximize total effort over both stages, but induces low effort in stage 1 and high effort in stage 2. By contrast, a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340562

Winner-Take-All and Proportional-Prize Contests : Theory and Experimental Results

Cason, Timothy N. - 2018

This study provides a unified framework to compare three canonical types of contests: winner-take-all contests won by the best performer, winner-take-all lotteries where probability of success is proportional to performance, and proportional-prize contests in which rewards are shared in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940281

Tournaments for the Endogenous Allocating of Prizes within Workteams - Theory and Experimental Evidence

Sutter, Matthias - 2004

We present a model where compensation within a workteam is determined endogenously by the use of a rank-order tournament. Team members compete in their efforts for the right to propose the distribution of a prize within the team. The implementation of a proposal requires the approval of other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072692