Showing 101 - 110 of 899
We introduce a generalized theoretical approach to study imitation and subject it to rigorous experimental testing. In our theoretical analysis we find that the different predictions of previous imitation models are due to different informational assumptions, not to different behavioral rules....
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10003023525
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10001919384
Most real world situations that are susceptible to herding are also characterized by direct payoff externalities. Yet, the bulk of the theoretical and experimental literature on herding has focused on pure informational externalities. In this paper we experi- mentally investigate the effects of...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10002235094
Brown and von Neumann introduced a dynamical system that converges to saddle points of zero sum games with finitely many strategies. Nash used the mapping underlying these dynamics to prove existence of equilibria in general games. The resulting Brown--von Neumann--Nash dynamics are a benchmark...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014224118
This experiment was designed to test various learning theories in the context of a Cournot oligopoly. We derive theoretical predictions for the learning theories and test these predictions by varying the information given to subjects. The results show that some subjects imitate successful...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014083224
We report results of a series of experiments designed to test the stability of the best reply process. With linear demand and cost functions, the process is stable if and only if there are less than three firms in the market. However, we find no experimental evidence of such instability in a...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014083226
In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014102412
The study of evolutionary dynamics was so far mainly restricted to finite strategy spaces. In this paper we show that this unsatisfying restriction is unnecessary. We specify a simple condition under which the continuous time replicator dynamics are well defined for the case of infinite strategy...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014141793
Two partners try to dissolve a partnership that owns an asset of ambiguous value, where the value is determined ex post by a draw from an Ellsberg urn. In a within-subject experiment, subjects make decisions in three different bargaining mechanisms: unstructured bargaining, the Texas shoot-out,...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014380287
Robo-advisors are novel tools in financial markets that provide investors with low-cost financial advice, usually based on individual characteristics like risk attitudes. In a portfolio choice experiment running over 10 weeks, we study how much investors benefit from robo advice. We also study...
Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014380288