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Bernergard, Axel - 2017

We consider contestants who must choose exactly one contest, out of several, to participate in. We show that when the contest technology is of a certain type, or when the number of contestants is large, a self-allocation equilibrium, i.e., one where no contestant would wish to change his choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947451

Game-Theoretical, Strategic Forward Contracting in the Electricity Market

Holmberg, Par - 2015

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers' market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013038567

Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part II : Solution Algorithm

Sarfati, Mahir - 2018

In part I of this paper, we proposed a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) to analyze imperfect competition of oligopoly producers in two-stage zonal power markets. In part II of this paper, we propose a solution algorithm which decomposes the proposed MILP model into several subproblems and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907352

Increase-Decrease Game Under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part I : Concept Analysis

Sarfati, Mahir - 2018

This paper is part I of a two-part paper. It proposes a two-stage game to analyze imperfect competition of producers in zonal power markets with a day-ahead and a real-time market. We consider strategic producers in both markets. They need to take both markets into account when deciding what to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012907353

The Strategic Timing of R&D Agreements

Marini, Marco A. - 2011

We present a model of endogenous formation of R&D agreements among firms in which also the timing of R&D investment is made endogenous. The purpose is to bridge two usually separate streams of literature, the noncooperative formation of R&D alliances and the endogenous timing literature. Our...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125628

Pre-play communication in Cournot competition : an experiment with students and managers

Waichman, Israel; Requate, Tilman; Siang, Ch’ng Kean - 2010

This study investigates the impact of pre-play communication on the outcomes in Cournot duopoly and triopoly … experiments, using both students and managers as subjects. Communication is implemented by two different devices, a ‘standardized …-communication’ and a free-communication device. We find that the effect of communication on collusion is larger in duopoly than in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008696726

Game theoretical, strategic forward contracting in the electricity market

Holmberg, Pär (contributor) - 2008

Forward sales is a credible commitment to aggressive spot market bidding, and it mitigates producers’ market power in electricity markets. Still it can be profitable for a producer to make such a commitment if it results in a soft response from competitors in the spot market (strategies are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723934

Self-allocation in contests

Bernergård, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl Erik - 2017

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718621

Providing efficient network access to green power generators : a long-term property rights perspective

Petropoulos, Georgios; Willems, Bert - 2016

Coordinating the timing and location of new production facilities is one of the challenges of liberalized power sectors. It is complicated by the presence of transmission bottlenecks, oligopolistic competition, and the unknown prospects of low-carbon technologies. The authors build a model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011613836

Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting

Collie, David R. - 2015

Taxation under oligopoly is analysed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximise the utility of their shareholders. It turns out that the model is an aggregative game, which simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011471542