Economics and innovation scholars have long recognized the potential of public procurement to trigger innovation. To what extent has this potential been realized so far? What can be done to improve the performance of PPI in this regard? This paper addresses these issues by providing a literature...

Reputational incentives may be a powerful mechanism for improving supplier performance and limiting the perverse effect of price competition on contract execution. We analyze a unique experiment run by a large utility company in Italy which introduced a new vendor rating system scoring its...

We find that - contrary to common perception - co-operation as equilibrium of the infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma is in many relevant cases not very plausible: For a significant subset of the payoff-discount factor parameter space, all co-operation equilibria are strictly risk...

I find that current US's and EU's Antitrust laws -- in particular their "moderate" leniency programmes that only reduce or at best cancel sanctions for price-fixing firms that self-report -- may make collusion enforceable even in one-shot competitive interactions, like Bertrand oligopolies and...

Leniency programs reduce sanctions for law violators that self-report. I focus on their ability to deter price-fixing cartels - and organized crime in general - by increasing incentives to "cheat" on partners. Moderate leniency programs that reduce/cancel sanctions for a spontaneously reporting...