In an agency model with adverse selection, we study how hidden interactions between agents affect the optimal contract …

, and inefficient project liquidation in one contracting problem. Our optimal contract is a dynamic mixture of relative and … turnover in bad market conditions. Finally, the optimal contract is implemented by risk management accounts, private debt and …

problem, I suggest a contracts approach to moral hazard. I use the “title-transfer” theory of contract to clarify the moral …

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the … bargaining power, the contract in the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution yields a more efficient outcome and induces more effort. The …

We examine a model of long-term contracting in which the buyer is privately informed about the stochastic process by … of environments in which the profit-maximizing long-term contract offered by a monopolist takes an especially simple … structure: we derive sufficient conditions on primitives under which the optimal contract consists of a menu of deterministic …

-telling incentive to herself, which, in turn, lowers the cost of inducing the agent to accept the contract …

entail a lower level of welfare for the parties to that contract. They also imply that real variables respond to nominal …

collective mechanism design by ignoring relative information evaluation, in generalized multi-agency contracting games under … Bayesian Nash equilibrium. We permit interdependent valuations, contract externalities, correlated types, and heterogeneous or …