I study a relational contracting model, in which the agent's discount factor is fixed and known, whereas the discount … factor of the principal is her private information. I find that, in the separating contract, information revelation is always … the optimal separating contract. I find that, in the optimal contract of the "good" type, the bonus payment for high …

We examine the optimal contract design for fighting bribery and extortion in a standard principal …

trades off the instantaneous audit cost versus the drift of the cash flow process. The contract is implemented in standard …

derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

second-best contract, but they are treated independently or as one bundled good. Dynamic contracts cannot solve the hold …

Incumbent firms, especially in high-tech industries, often contract and collaborate with small research units on single … projects. A delicate resulting contracting decision thus is how to allocate control. This paper considers the incumbent …'s problem to design a research contract that specifies: the allocation of control; the unit's research input, and its monetary …

In this paper, I study the optimal dynamic contract in a principal-agent model wherein the agent with transparent …-dependent target, where actions are committed based on the agent's report history. I solve the optimal contract in closed-form, which …

Contract law treats consumer attention as if it were unlimited. We instead view consumer attention as a scarce resource … information that depletes their attention and prevents competition on contract terms. We propose a novel solution to this market … through a Pigouvian tax on the presentation of a consumer contract, proportionate to the attention costs that reading and …