We study decentralized learning in organizations. Decentralization is captured through a symmetry constraint on agents’ strategies. Among such attainable strategies, we solve for optimal and equilibrium strategies. We model the organization as a repeated game with imperfectly observable...

We consider a class of dynamic games in which each player’s actions are unobservable to the other players and each player’s actions can influence a state variable that is unobservable to the other players. We develop an algorithm that solves for the subset of sequential equilibria in which...

We propose a definition of time consistent policy for infinite horizon economies with competitive private agents. Allocations and policies are defined as functions of the history of past policies. A sustainable equilibrium is a sequence of history-contingent policies and allocations that satisfy...

Methods are presented for solving a certain class of rational expectations models, principally those that arise from dynamic games. The methods allow for numerical solution using spectral factorization algorithms and for estimation of these models using maximum likelihood techniques.

Weighted voting games are ubiquitous mathematical models which are used in economics, political science, neuroscience, threshold logic, reliability theory and distributed systems. They model situations where agents with variable voting weight vote in favour of or against a decision. A coalition...

Voting Power Indices enable the analysis of the distribution of power in a legislature or voting body which uses weighted voting. Although the approach, based on co-operative game theory, has been known for a long time it has not been very widely applied, in part because of the difficulty of...

In a game between two exporting countries, both countries may be better off if they both delegate to policymakers who maximise tax revenue rather than welfare. However, both countries delegating to policymakers who maximise revenue is not necessarily a Nash equilibrium. The game may be a...

We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However,...

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) enable negative interest rates. A game is analyzed between a central bank (accounting for the government's interest) and a representative household choosing to consume, hold CBDC, or hold non-CBDC. The central bank chooses negative interest rate when it...