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Provider Selection and Renegotiation Incentive of Incomplete Contracts : Empirical Relevance on Public Work Procurement

Guccio, Calogero - 2010

the specification of the type of contract to be awarded. Less attention has been paid to the incompleteness of the … contract; this issue is relevant in the public work sector because it offers room for the contract renegotiation and, therefore … procedures (i.e. negotiation vs. auction) on the contract renegotiation in the public work sector. The results show that, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149716

Venture capital contracts : a survey of the recent literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013261118

Contracts offered by bureaucrats

Khalil, Fahad; Kim, Doyoung; Lawarrée, Jacques - 2013

We examine the power of incentives in bureaucracies by studying contracts offered by a bureaucrat to her agent. The bureaucrat operates under a fixed budget, optimally chosen by a funding authority, and she can engage in policy drift, which we define as inversely related to her intrinsic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010212358

Venture capital contracts : a survey of the recent literature

Schertler, Andrea - 2000

This paper surveys empirical and theoretical studies of various control mechanisms embedded in venture capital contracts. These mechanisms mitigate incentive problems and opportunistic behavior arising in the uncertain environment of financing young hightechnology enterprises that predominantly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011473815

Incentive contracts when agents distort probabilities

Gonzalez Jimenez, Victor H. - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 15 (2024) 3, pp. 607-653

I show that stochastic contracts generate powerful incentives when agents suffer from probability distortion. When implementing these contracts, the principal can target probability distortions in order to inflate the agent's perceived benefits of exerting high levels of effort. This novel...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015053193

Agent Discretion, Adverse Selection, and the Risk-Incentive Trade-Off

Adams, Christopher - 2003

A basic tenet of incentive theory states that there is a trade-off between risk and incentives. By implication, greater variation in firm profits leads to a reduction in the use of profit sharing. Surprisingly, there is little empirical evidence for this relationship. This paper reexamines the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014088114

Optimal Afforestation Contracts with Asymmetric Information on Private Environmental Benefits

Anthon, Signe; Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark - 2014

We investigate the problem of subsidising afforestation when private information exists with respect to the level of private utility derived from the project. We develop a simple model that allows for an intelligent design of contracts when information is asymmetric. The model involves the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014072454