types, we find that the optimal contract may be very simple, paying the supervisor a flat wage independent of his type and … his evaluation of the agent's effort. Such a contract induces the neutral type of supervisor to report the agent … performance (leniency bias) may be the outcome of an optimal contract under informational asymmetries …

I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent's marginal return of …

cost. The robust contract generates a seemingly excessive pay-performance sensitivity. The worst-case effort cost is high … contract is misspecified, i.e., when he is offered the robust contract, but his true effort cost is constant. I find that …

Principals seek to trade with agents by posting incentive contracts in a search environment. A contract solves the ex … searching requires internalizing the utility of agents. Incentives are weaker than in bilateral contracting, and agents enjoy …

characterization of the collusive-supervision contract shows that collusion should be allowed with one agent only …

We consider the problem of a principal who wishes to contract with a privately informed agent and is not able to commit … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …-to-use tool to analyze contracting problems with limited commitment. We apply the solution concept to a setting with a continuous …

We examine how the reputation concern of contracting parties affects contractual incentives if information is … transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract …

principal is ambiguity averse, and designs a contract which is robust to the worst case effort cost process. Ambiguity divides … the contract into two regions. After sufficiently high performance, the agent reaches the over-compensation region, where … he receives excessive benefits compared to the contract without ambiguity, while after low performance, he enters the …