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Design a contract! : A simple principal-agent problem as a classroom experiment

Gächter, Simon (contributor); … - 2006

important concepts of organizational economics and contracting. In a first part, students take the role of a principal and … design a contract that consists of a fixed payment and an incentive component. In the second part, students take the role of … contracting. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003315162

Design a contract! : A simple principal-agent problem as a classroom experiment

Gächter, Simon (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003321818

Fairness, incentives and contractual incompleteness

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2001

We show that concerns for fairness may have dramatic consequences for the optimal provision of incentives in a moral hazard context. Incentive contracts that are optimal when there are only selfish actors become inferior when some agents are concerned about fairness. Conversely, contracts that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398105

Do sellers offer menus of contracts to separate buyer types? : an experimental test of adverse selection theory

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - In: Games and economic behavior 89 (2015), pp. 17-33

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011383729

Managerial optimism and debt contract design

Adam, Tim R.; Burg, Valentin; Scheinert, Tobias; … - In: Three essays on the syndicated loan market, (pp. 49-97). 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373645

On imperfect commitment in contracts

Semenov, Aggey - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376882

Impatience versus incentives

Opp, Marcus M.; Zhu, John Y. - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 83 (2015) 4, pp. 1601-1617

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011405089

Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - In: Review of economic design : RED 19 (2015) 3, pp. 173-209

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409065

Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies

Saygili, Kemal; Kucuksenel, Serkan - 2018

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011869786

A note on interval delegation

Amador, Manuel; Bagwell, Kyle; Frankel, Alex - In: Economic theory bulletin 6 (2018) 2, pp. 239-249

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011976227