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Incentives, termination payments, and CEO contracting
Gillan, Stuart L.; Nguyen Nga - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 41 (2016), pp. 445-465
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011619883
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Equity contracts and incentive design in start-up teams
Kagan, Evgeny; Leider, Stephen; Lovejoy, William S. - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 66 (2019) 10, pp. 4879-4898
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012305310
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Contract design capability as a trust enabler in the pre-formation phase of interfirm relationships
Shen, Lu; Su, Chenting; Zheng, Xu; Zhuang, Guijun - In: Journal of business research : JBR 95 (2019), pp. 103-115
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011979819
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Optimal short-termism
Hackbarth, Dirk; Rivera, Alejandro; Wong, Tak-Yuen - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 68 (2022) 9, pp. 6477-6505
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013373017
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Supplier goal commitment in performance-based contracts : the lens of goal-setting theory
Celik, Hasan; Nowicki, David R.; Uvet, Hasan; Adana, Saban - In: International journal of physical distribution and … 53 (2023) 10, pp. 1158-1186
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014466320
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Optimal Contracts When Enforcement is a Decision Variable
Krasa, Stefan; Villamil, Anne Patricia - 1999
This paper analyzes choice-theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially … informed investor and entrepreneur. An intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism is which there is limited commitment to … enforcement on the structure of optimal contracts. The paper shows that simple debt is the optimal contract when commitment is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200991
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Contracting with Externalities
Segal, Ilya - 1999
The paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014216292
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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences : An Experimental Study
Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - 2012
Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014162484
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
Governments must usually take policy decisions with an imperfect knowledge of the economic actors' type or the actors' effort level. These issues are addressed within the framework of classic adverse selection or moral hazard models. I discuss in this paper how would the government’s and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955
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Communicating subjective evaluations
Lang, Matthias - 2012 - this version: August 2013
Should principals explain and justify their evaluations? In this paper the principal's evaluation is private information, but she can provide justification by sending a costly cheap-talk message. I show that the principal explains her evaluation to the agent if the evaluation turns out to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569527