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Gautier, Axel; Paolini, Dimitri - 2003

be contracted for. With these simple contracts, we show that delegation is an alternative to contracting to elicit agent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151717

Contracting with Externalities

Segal, Ilya - 2001

The paper studies inefficiencies arising in contracting between one principal and N agents when each agent's utility …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014209684

Level-k mechanism design

De Clippel, Geoffroy; Saran, Rene; Serrano, Roberto - 2016 - This version: July 2016

Models of choice where agents see others as less sophisticated than themselves have significantly different, sometimes more accurate, predictions in games than does Nash equilibrium. When it comes to mechanism design, however, they turn out to have surprisingly similar implications. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011515723

Mediated audits

Pollrich, Martin - 2015

new light on the usefulness of mediation in contracting and on the design of optimal mechanisms. … each reported type the mediator randomizes over a base-contract and the audit contract, accompanied by a recommendation to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011285322

Incentives and Equilibrium in Agency with Adverse Selection

Faynzilberg, Peter S. - 2015

We show that contracting in agency with voluntary participation may involve incentives for the agent's abstention … lead to breakdown of contracting in circumstances where the extant approach predicts trade. Unlike in agency with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013021575

Incentive compability of dual transfer pricing

Carstens, Stefan; Weinem, Michael - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001636080

Multilayered tournaments

Ishida, Junichiro - 2013

In many facets of life, we often face competition with a multilayered structure in which different levels of competition take place simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a new class of tournament models, called multilayered tournaments, to capture this type of competitive environment. Among...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009778614

Incentive design and mis-allocated effort : conference paper

Schnedler, Wendelin - 2013 - Preliminary version

Incentives often distort behavior: they induce agents to exert effort but this effort is not employed optimally. This paper proposes a theory of incentive design allowing for such distorted behavior. At the heart of the theory is a trade-off between getting the agent to exert effort and ensuring...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344596

Delegation and nonmonetary incentives ; [1]

Ambrus, Attila; Egorov, Georgij V. - 2015

In many contracting settings, actions costly to one party but with no direct benefits to the other (money-burning) may … be part of the explicit or implicit contract. A leading example is bureaucratic procedures in an employer … function of the agent's choice of action, and show that money-burning may be part of the optimal contract. This result holds …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011524157

Can a bonus overcome moral hazard? : experimental evidence from markets for expert services

Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2018

Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706