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How Ego-Threats Facilitate Contracts Based on Subjective Evaluations
Sebald, Alexander - 2008
-perceptions and thereby generate costs of conflict for the principal. We identify conditions for a positive welfare effect of … increasing costs of conflict or increasing sensitivity to ego-threats, and a negative welfare effect of a more informative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012723086
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Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
Gershkov, Alex; Perry, Motty - 2010
work/pass is public, his effort is his private information. The optimal contract-pair which takes advantage of the dynamic … nature of the interaction is characterized. It is shown that as the length of the contract increases, the expected transfer …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195069
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Contracting with Disagreement about Performance Evaluation and Compensation
Li, Anqi - 2015
I examine incentive contracting with an agent who disagrees with the principal and creates organizational frictions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014164085
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Motivate and Select : Relational Contracts with Persistent Types
Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2016
's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics and the distribution of employees …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006141
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Optimal Dynamic Contracts with Moral Hazard and Costly Monitoring
Piskorski, Tomasz - 2016
optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012983280
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On Multitasking and Job Design in Relational Contracts
Ishihara, Akifumi - 2019
We investigate job design problems in relational contracting environments with multitasking and an aggregated and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903038
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Dynamic Contracting with Moral Hazard Under Incomplete Information
Mekonnen, Teddy - 2018
I study a continuous time principal-agent model in which an unknown parameter and the agent's hidden effort affect the distribution of observable outcomes. The principal and the agent learn about the parameter by observing past outcomes. The agent's current effort has an implicit long-term...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908103
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Dynamic Managerial Compensation : A Mechanism Design Approach
Garrett, Daniel Ferguson - 2010
generate profits for the firm varies stochastically over time. The optimal contract is obtained as the solution to a dynamic …-neutral, the optimal contract can often be implemented with a simple pay package that is linear in the firm's profits. Furthermore …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142525
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Incentive Contracts in Delegated Portfolio Management
Li, C. Wei - 2010
faces moral hazard with respect to the effort and risk choices of the portfolio manager. The employment contract promises … appropriate choice of benchmark it is always optimal to include a bonus incentive fee in the contract. We derive the conditions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013149935
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The Complexity of CEO Compensation
Jarque, Arantxa - 2014
sensitivity of consumption-to-output that is dictated by the optimal contract. Heterogeneity in the structure of firm uncertainty … implies that some firms are able to implement the optimal contract with very simple schemes that do not include options …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047902