We study optimal contracting in a setting where a firm repeatedly interacts with multiple workers, and can compensate … be decoupled from his truth-telling incentives. This makes the optimal static contract inefficient and relational … contracts based on the public signals increase efficiency. In the optimal contract, it may be optimal to ignore signals that are …

progress. The optimal contract involves a "soft deadline" wherein the principal guarantees funding up to a certain date -- if …

We study a dynamic contracting problem in which the principal can allocate his limited capacity between seeking …

study a principal-multi-agent relational contracting model in which the optimal contract resembles a bonus pool. It … results. In this case, the optimal contract either ignores the team measure completely or uses it to create a conditional …

from optimal incentive contracting across feasible values of the agent's expected rents. We thus show how economically …

We study dynamic contracting with adverse selection and limited commitment. A firm (the principal) and a worker (the … low, the firm offers a pooling contract and no information is ever revealed. In contrast, if this prior probability is …

optimal long-term contract between principal and agent. Monitoring adds value by allowing the principal to reduce the …

information about the technology, and both seek robust performance from a contract in relation to their respective worst …-case scenarios. We show that the optimal long-term contract aligns the party's pessimistic expectations and broadly features …