Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties' trust, defined as their belief in other's trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … contract enforcement are complements. We demonstrate that under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from …

Under weak contract enforcement the trading parties’ trust, defined as their belief in other’s trustworthiness, appears … appear less important, suggesting that trust and contract enforcement are substitutes. Here we show, however, that trust and … under weak contract enforcement trust has no effect on gains from trade, but when we successively improve contract …

, trust-defined as the belief in the trustworthiness of others-seems important for realizing gains from trade. This paper … explores an unstudied question: whether trust is a substitute for, or a complement to, the availability of contract enforcement … opportunities. One intuition suggests that trust becomes more important when contract enforcement is weak, implying that they are …

-um sized enterprises (SMEs). In addition, the role of trust in accessing finance for such enterprises is under … trust that suppliers and bank managers have in the enterprise. The extended model, suggests that the higher the level of … trust that bank managers and suppliers have in the SME, the more short-term finance an SME can obtain and should use. …