Optimal risk sharing in financial markets requires investors with high risk-bearing capacity to hold relatively large stakes. But holding large stakes might incentivize such investors to expend resources in monitoring the firm, a public good. Does this dissuade them from acquiring large stakes?...

What is the effect of offering agents an option to delay their choices in a global coordination game? We address this question by considering a canonical binary action global game, and allowing players to delay their irreversible decisions. Those that delay have access to accurate private...

We consider a takeover in which risk neutral bidders must incur participation costs and study their optimal strategy. We found that bidders decision of participation is endogenous. There is a threshold of private participation cost above that a potential bidder will stay out of takeover process....

This paper analyses accounting related to corporate governance and is organized as follows. The first section deals with understanding the concept of accounting conservatism. In the second section we analyzed the Relevance of Accounting Conservatism in Corporate Governance to the modern...

We present a model of succession in a firm owned and managed by its founder. The founder decides between hiring a professional manager or leaving management to his heir, as well as on how much, if any, of the shares to float on the stock exchange. We assume that a professional is a better...