In 1963, Anscombe and Aumann demonstrated that the introduction of an objective randomizing device into the Savage setting of subjective uncertainty considerably simplified the derivation of subjective probability from a decision maker's preferences over uncertain bets. The purpose of this paper...

Ambiguous choice problems which involve three or more outcome values can reveal aspects of ambiguity and ambiguity aversion which cannot be displayed in the classic two-outcome Ellsberg urn problems, and hence are not always captured by models designed to accommodate them. These aspects include...

Choice problems in the spirit of Ellsberg (1961) suggest that rank-dependent ("Choquet expected utility") preferences over subjective gambles might be subject to the same difficulties that Ellsberg's earlier examples posed for subjective expected utility. These difficulties stem from...

Although their goal is to separate a decision maker's underlying beliefs (their subjective probabilities of events) from their preferences (their attitudes toward risk), classic choice-theoretic derivations of subjective probability all rely upon some form of the Marschak-Samuelson "Independence...

This paper uses the tools and techniques of generalized expected utility analysis to explore the robustness of some of the classical basic results in insurance theory to departures from the expected utility hypothesis on agents' risk preferences. The areas explored consist of individual demand...

When forecasts of the future value of some variable, or the probability of some event, are used for purposes of ex ante planning or decision making, then the preferences, opportunities and constraints of the decision maker will all enter into the ex post evaluation of a forecast, and the ex post...