We wish to analyze the consequences of strategically sophisticated bidding without assuming equilibrium behavior. As a first step, we characterize interim rationalizable bids in first-price auctions with interdependent values and affiliated signals. We show that (1) every non-zero bid below the...

A characterization of “generalized Bayesian updating” in a maxmin expected utility setting is provided. The key axioms are consequentialism and constant-act dynamic consistency. The latter requires that, if an arbitrary act f is preferred (inferior) to a constant act y conditional upon E,...

Recent theories of choice under uncertainty represent ambiguity via multiple priors, informally interpreted as alternative probabilistic models of the uncertainty that the decision-maker considers equally plausible. This paper provides a robust behavioral foundation for this interpretation. A...

We propose a simple theoretical model of supervised learning that is potentially useful to interpret a number of empirical phenomena. The model captures a basic tradeoff between sheltering the child from the consequences of his mistakes, and allowing him to learn from experience. We characterize...

We propose a simple theoretical model of supervised learning that is potentially useful to interpret a number of empirical phenomena relevant to the nature-nurture debate. The model captures a basic trade-off between sheltering the child from the consequences of his mistakes and allowing him to...

This paper analyzes sophisticated dynamic choice for ambiguity-sensitive decision makers. It characterizes Consistent Planning via axioms on preferences over decision trees. Furthermore, it shows how to elicit conditional preferences from prior preferences. The key axiom is a weakening of...