The optimal weights on indicators in models with partial information about the state of the economy and forward-looking variables are derived and interpreted, both for equilibria under discretion and under commitment. The private sector is assumed to have information about the state of the...

This paper seeks to investigate the existence and importance of collective intelligence to reduce information frictions by informing potential early-stage investors about venture quality. My context is an online platform where the community score projects, offering new insights into how the...

States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states' willingness to ratify the treaty. A state might decline to ratify a treaty it otherwise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. Negotiators would like to uncover the...

This chapter focuses on a series of experiments investigating decision behavior in single-stage, two-person bargaining over the exchange of a single commodity, where neither trader knows with precision the reservation value that the other places on the good or service being bought or sold....

The present paper analyzes a general class of first-price all-pay auctions where two players have different "bidding technologies" and one bidder has a head start advantage over his/her opponent. Prize values are common knowledge and may be different between the players. Equilibria are...

Prices usually adjust much faster when costs increase than when costs decrease. The mechanism driving this Rockets-and-Feathers phenomenon is not well understood despite of ample empirical evidence for its existence.We use simple experimental markets with and without consumer search and either...

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are 'close' to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

This paper proposes a way to solve two (and multiple) sided incomplete information games which generally generates a unique equilibrium. The approach uses iterative conjectures updated by game theoretic and Bayesian statistical decision theoretic reasoning. Players in the games form conjectures...