We provide a discipline for belief formation through an evolutionary process which favors beliefs leading to higher utility levels at the Walrasian equilibrium. We show that such an evolutionary process converges to the Nash equilibrium in a game of strategic beliefs choices. The asymptotic...

I study the evolutionary stability of 'mildly responsive' behavioural rules in a bargaining game. Individuals in a population (that may be finite or be described by individuals distributed uniformly over a continuum of fixed mass) bargain with all other individuals in a pair-wise manner over a...

Conventional wisdom portrays contracts as static distillations of parties’ shared intent at some discrete point in time. In reality, however, contract terms evolve in response to their environments, including new laws, legal interpretations, and economic shocks. While several legal scholars...

The subject matter of evolutionary game theory is the analysis of conflict and cooperation in animals and plants. Originally, game theory was developed as a theory of human strategic behavior based on an idealized picture of rational decision making. Evolutionary game theory does not rely on...

Population games describe strategic interactions among large numbers of small, anonymous agents. Behavior in these games is typically modeled dynamically, with agents occasionally receiving opportunities to switch strategies, basing their choices on simple myopic rules called revision protocols...

This chapter reviews the origin and development of game-theoretic ideas in biology. It covers more than half a century of research and focuses on those models and conceptual advancements that are rooted in fundamental biological theory and have been exposed to substantial empirical scrutiny. The...

Traditional game theory studies strategic interactions in which the agents make rational decisions. Evolutionary game theory differs in two key respects: the focus is on large populations of individuals who interact at random rather than on small numbers of players; and individuals are assumed...

This paper surveys recent work on the evolutionary origins of preferences. We are especially interested in the circumstances under which evolution would push preferences away from the self-interested perfectly-rational expected utility maximization of classical economic theory in order to...

We develop an evolutionary stable equilibrium model of the individuals' choice to become an entrepreneur by applying equilibrium analysis method of evolutionary game theory. According to whether he has latent entrepreneurial (carving out) ability and latent innovative ability, we separated the...