This paper reviews the literature on ticket pricing in the entertaniment industry. All along, I try to evaluate whether ticket markets outeomes are consistent with theoretical predictions. Overall, the literature provides a good understanding for observed variations in ticket prices. The...

We review the principal--agent multi-tasking literature and discuss the relevance of this literature to the implementation of performance measurement in public organizations. Arguably, the most important lesson from the literature is that performance measurement may elicit dysfunctional and...

I extend DeGraba's model of buying frenzies. I identify conditions under which buying frenzies are the only possible equilibrium and under which rationing occurs in equilibrium

This Paper studies a monopolist selling tickets to consumers who learn new information about their demands over time. The monopolist can sell early to uninformed consumers and/or close to the event date to informed ones, it can ration tickets and allow ticket holders to resell. I show that...

This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training...

This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine...

Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients...