This paper studies the provision of incentives in the large federal bureaucracy created under the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982. We find that bureaucrats respond to these incentives by maximizing their private rewards, possibly at the expense of social welfare. We argue that the inability...

We model the sorting of medical students across medical occupations and identify a mechanism that explains the possibility of differential productivity across occupations. The model combines moral hazard and matching of physicians and occupations with pre-matching investments. In equilibrium...

We build on recent work analyzing consumers' ability to save by exploiting price dispersion in grocery stores. We show that store expensiveness is not universal but varies across consumers depending on the basket they consume. We incorporate this insight into a decomposition of price variance...

Can enrolment incentives reduce the incidence of cream-skimming in the delivery of public sector services (e.g. education, health, job training)? In the context of a large government job training program, we investigate whether the use of enrolment incentives that set different 'shadow prices'...