In ticket markets, consumers often learn their valuations over time meaning that they do not know how much they value the good until they are about to consume it. When consumers' valuations can change arbitrarily over time, the aggregate demand also changes over time, but not so arbitrarily. In...

We present a model of price discrimination where a monopolist faces a consumer who is privately informed about the distribution of his valuation for an indivisible unit of good but has yet to learn privately the actual valuation. The monopolist sequentially screens the consumer with a menu of...

We present a model of timing of seasonal sales in which stores choose several designs before the season without knowing which, if any, is fashionable. Stores begin by charging high prices to capture the fashion market. As the season approaches the end with goods still unsold, stores have sales...

We use the experimental method to study the costs and benefits of allowing joint bidding in simultaneous multi-unit first price sealed bid auctions for bundled goods. The research has immediate applications to the sale of public forest stands that arbor a mixture of species. Joint bidding and...