Financial theory holds that firms can control agency costs through the use of short-term and secured debt. We examine the relation between the use of secured debt and the incentive of the manager to increase the risk of the firm, as measured by vega. We find that firms utilize secured debt to a...

We examine managerial compensation and wealth sensitivities around CEO changes. The average new CEO is incentivized to increase the risk of the firm primarily because he holds significantly less stock than his predecessor, and in fact riskier policy choices are subsequently implemented. Similar...

We examine the relation between liquidation costs and capital structure for 88 firms that reorganized under Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code. Firms in Chapter 11 must disclose information on post-reorganization financial claims and the estimated going concern and liquidation value of the assets...

We examine the impact of managerial risk exposure on capital structure selection by comparing a sample of 123 all-equity firms to a set of levered firms matched on the basis of industry, market cap and market-to-book assets. Net debt levels decline as CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price...