The problem of optimal public enforcement of law is examined in a model in which two types of enforcement effort are distinguished: specific enforcement effort, activity devoted to apprehending and penalizing individuals who have committed a single type of harmful act; and general enforcement...

The purpose of this study is to assess whether competition agencies (“CAs”) do, and in turn should, enjoy an unfettered discretionary power in the context of the investigation of competition law infringements or whether their margin of discretion should be subject to certain limits. To this...

In his writings, Bill Kovacic has made the case for applying more widely Section 5 of the FTC Act in US antitrust enforcement, and in particular vis-à-vis dominant firms. Among other things, Bill advocates that Section 5 should be enforced independently of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and...

The main issue that is still disrupting private enforcement of competition law is the calculation of damages. The 2014 Damages Directive contains some alleviations. Particularly Article 17(2) Damages Directive foresees a rebuttable presumption that cartels cause harm. Despite the clear statement...

Corporate compliance programs have become increasingly criminalized. In the truest of ironies, companies have adopted compliance protocols that are motivated by and mimic application of the law they seek to avoid most. This approach to compliance — using the precepts of criminal enforcement...

Common ownership fundamentally upsets the well-settled merger enforcement ecosystem. Not only it challenges basic principles informing merger policy such as the presumed profitability of mergers for the merging firms and the merger-specificity of potential efficiencies but also it works against...

This research explores the role of trademark litigation as a deterrent strategy against counterfeiters in markets where government trademark enforcement is weak. Litigation can convey to potential counterfeiters that a trademark-holding firm would sue upon entry. We explore this idea empirically...

This paper studies the role of commitment in the design of enforcement mechanisms when enforcement can remedy harm from non-compliance. We consider a game between an enforcement authority ("enforcer") and an offender in which either the enforcer or the offender may act as a Stackelberg leader....

This paper investigates the impact of economics conditions (carrots) and sanctions (sticks) on murder, assault, robbery, burglary and motor vehicle theft in New York City, using monthly time-series data spanning 1974-1999. Carrots are measured by the unemployment rate and the real minimum wage;...