In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the transparency of banks and the fragility of the banking system. We show that information-based bank runs may be inefficient because the deposit contract designed to provide liquidity induces depositors to have excessive incentives to...

This paper demonstrates that, even if depositors are fully rational and always choose the Pareto dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria, a bank run may still occur when depositors' expectations of the bank's fundamentals do not change. More specifically, a bank run may occur...

This paper demonstrates that subordinated debt (‘subdebt' thereafter) regulation can be an effective mechanism for disciplining banks. Under our proposal, investors buy the subdebt of a bank only if they receive favourable information about the bank, and the bank is subject to a regulatory...

Banks play a unique role in society. They not only maximize profits but also consider the interests of stakeholders. We investigate whether banks consider firms’ pollution records in their lending decisions. The evidence shows that banks offer significantly higher loan spreads, higher total...

Better developed legal and political institutions result in greater availability of reliable firm-specific information. When stock prices reflect more firm-specific information there will be less stock price synchronicity. This paper traces the experience of China, an economy undergoing dramatic...

This paper examines the fundamental relationship between retail payments and the real economy. Using data from across 27 European markets over the period 1995-2009, the results confirm that migration to efficient electronic retail payments stimulates the overall economy, consumption and trade....